Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting

me to participate. I had prepared a list of issues that I thought,

taken together, would help in an orderly discussion of what American

policy toward Iraq should be. One of the consequences of

speaking last after three intelligent presentations is, one is bound

to be repetitive or disagreeable, and I intend to be both.

The question has been posed and answered already: Is Saddam

stronger now than he was 10 years ago? I think everybody agrees

that he is. I think he is stronger than he was at this time 2 years

ago, and I am almost afraid to ask the question whether he is

stronger than he was 2 days ago, but I feel bound to say, he probably

is stronger than he was 2 days ago, because what has been

presented in recent diplomatic efforts is not an indication of American

strength but an indication of American weakness.

That is to say, the clear impression has been created that the

United States intends to relax the sanctions on Saddam. We can

call them smart sanctions if we like, but what they will look like

to the people of the region and, I think, the world, is a weakening

of American resolve in the face of pressure on those sanctions,

which is evident to everyone.

Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction? Sure he

does. We know he has chemical weapons. We know he has biological

weapons. We have been unable to ferret them out and find

them. We could not do it when we had inspectors on the ground.

We will not be able to do it if the inspectors return.

How far he has gone on the nuclear weapons side, I do not think

we really know. My guess is it is further than we think. It is always

further than we think, because we limit ourselves, as we

think about this, to what we are able to prove and demonstrate

and, unless you believe that we have uncovered everything, you

have to assume there is more than we are able to report, and that

is the history of these things, so I am sure Tony Cordesman would

agree that every time you eventually get behind the lines you discover

there was more there than you thought.

How can we end his program to deliver weapons of mass destruction,

to develop them and the means of delivering them? Well, I do

not think we can, as long as Saddam is there. As long as he is in

control of the territory and has sufficient financial and technical resources,

he will continue to work at the development of those weapons.

We cannot learn much, in my view, in the absence of U.N. inspectors.

I do not think we would learn much if the U.N. inspectors

were there. Even if the U.N. inspectors were there and free to operate

in an effective manner, and the history suggests and the arrangements

previously agreed to suggest that if inspectors were

permitted to return, they would be under such constraints that

their likelihood of their finding anything at all is very slim.

After all, Saddam has had plenty of time to destroy the data base

on which we once depended and, without intelligence of a kind that

we can get independent of the inspectors, there is really very little

that inspectors could do on the ground, so I do not think we would

get any additional confidence if inspectors returned.

I mention that because the suggestion has been made that we

would welcome Saddam back into the community of civilized nations

if he only agreed to U.N. resolutions providing for inspections.

I think that would be a great mistake. Any agreement to inspections

would be tactical and disingenuous, and the ticket to civilization

should not be as cheap as that.

Needless to say, the return of inspectors would hardly justify the

normalization of relations with a man like Saddam. In fact, I do

not believe we ought to even aspire to normal relations with a man

who rules the way Saddam Hussein rules. There is nothing wrong

with distinguishing between those national leaders with whom we

wish to have normal relations and those who are beneath that

minimal standard.

Beyond the weapons of mass destruction, which I think we all

agree is proceeding to develop, how should we regard the view that

Saddam has been contained all these years during which we all

agree the situation has gotten worse? Well, containment became a

slogan rather than a policy some years ago. Contained maybe in

the sense that Tony Cordesman referred to.

He has been unable to buy weapons on the scale that he might

have been able to buy weapons otherwise, but there was a parade,

a military parade in Baghdad just a few days ago, and he demonstrated

a thousand tanks, which I think is roughly double the

number he had at the end of Desert Storm, so he has managed to

double his tank force despite the constraints. Clearly, he would

have done more if he had been able to do more, so in that rather

narrow sense you could say that his military ambitions, at least for

conventional forces, has been contained, but that is about all you

can say.

The sanctions I think everyone agrees are not working in the

sense that they have not produced a significant change or, indeed,

any change in Saddam’s policy, in his ambition to acquire weapons

of mass destruction, in his defiance of U.N. resolutions and the

United Nations itself. They have been portrayed as damaging to

the people of Iraq. I think everyone on this panel agrees that the

suffering of the Iraqi people is being inflicted directly by Saddam

Hussein himself. The food that could be dispersed under the existing

program is not being dispersed. The same thing is true of medicine.

Money is piling up in Saddam’s bank. He is using the privation

of his own people as a means of propaganda.

Now, the point has been made this morning, and I think the Secretary

of State has been attempting to argue this on his recent mission

abroad, that we should organize the sanctions differently in

order to make them more effective, and one of the things that he

means by that is that smuggling activities should be legalized. We

are not doing a very good job of controlling drugs, so let us legalize

the drugs. That is rather analogous to that. But there is oil moving

through a pipeline from Syria. That is smuggling, and Saddam has

access to the money, so let us make it legal.

The problem first of all is not money. Saddam has the money

that I believe he needs to do what he is doing clandestinely, and

since nobody envisions allowing him to spend that money openly on

weapons, you have got to ask, what difference is it going to make

to his program if the amount of money available to him is reduced?

It is far from obvious, but the fact is that putting money into the

U.N. program is no guarantee that it is kept from Saddam.

Saddam has a variety of means that I have not heard discussed

by which he siphons money out of the United Nations programs.

It includes everything from front companies that do business with

the United Nations that are, in fact, Iraqi proprietary companies,

to the standard techniques that are used all over the world to

evade restrictions on capital movements and the like, where imports

are approved by the United Nations, invoices paid, and significant

fractions of the money come back secretly to the regime.

So Saddam, even within the United Nations program, is able to

acquire all the money that he can usefully spend, in my view, on

his clandestine program to achieve weapons of mass destruction, so

at the end of the day you have to ask yourself, what is smarter or

better about smarter sanctions? They are weaker sanctions, to be

sure. They are intended to reshape opinion in the Arab world, by

which I think we should mean the street, because Arab leaders are

a good deal more sophisticated than we sometimes give them credit

for, and they understand perfectly well what is going on, but we

want to reshape the image in the street of the United States as

punishing the innocent civilians in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I come to the conclusion after all of this that we

do not have an effective policy now. The changes that are being

talked about will be no more effective than we have had in the

past, that we will not be safe from the eventual development of the

means of delivering weapons of mass destruction against us,

against our friends and allies in the region, against our troops in

the field, as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. The risk will continue

until the day he is removed from office.

Therefore, it seems to me worth concentrating our efforts on the

one policy that could actually work, and that is the removal of Saddam

from power. Now, it is not easy. I concede, it is not easy, but

neither is it reasonable to characterize it as hopeless.

For one thing, before characterizing any ambitious program, one

ought to look at it carefully, and I have been struck by how much

of the comment about the prospects for success is based not on any

serious study, not on any serious analysis, not on sitting down with

the opposition to Saddam, who are prepared to risk their lives by

returning to Iraq and be mobilized within Iraq, but on pure assumption,

pure speculation.

I keep hearing about Iraqi opposition sitting around hotels in

Mayfair. Who are we talking about? It is not true. It is simply

false. I spent the last 15 years getting to know the Iraqi opposition,

and when people in the comfort of their homes and offices in Washington,

DC deride the Iraqi opposition for sitting around hotels in

Mayfair, when they have been in Iraq, when they are eager to return

to Iraq, when they have seen their closest friends and associates

and family murdered in Iraq, seems to me unfair to them and

an unreasonable conjecture about their motives.

So the question remains of their abilities. What can they do? You

know, I suspect if the sort of derision that is heaped on the opposition

today had been around in the early days of our history, we

would still be a British colony. I am sure there were people who

said, those Americans are never going to get organized. They are

divided. The people in Virginia cannot agree with the people in

Massachusetts.

I do not mean to oversimplify this, but the fact is that when you

spend the time to understand the opposition, and when you look at

plausible opposition strategies, the picture that emerges is very different

from the dismissive view that we have heard out of the Clinton

administration for the last 8 years.

It is an opposition that has pulled itself together, that has a

structure within which it meets and takes decisions. It is an opposition

that has made clear its intention to abandon weapons of

mass destruction and embrace democratic principles. It is an opposition

that is eager to return to Iraq and, most of all, it is an opposition

that in the past was able to organize itself in a major part

of the country that was beyond the control of Saddam Hussein.

Over a third of the country was, until 1996, outside Saddam Hussein’s

control.

Now, Mort Halperin has repeated the specter that if we want to

do anything at all for the opposition we have to be prepared to

mount a military operation. I think he said it might be less than

Desert Storm, 1/2 million men, and I do not know what strategy

he is looking at, but I can tell you what strategy I think it makes

sense at least to consider, and that is this:

That is, to support the Iraqi opposition, to support the Iraqi National

Congress in reestablishing its presence in parts of Iraq that

are not under Saddam’s control. That can be done, and it can be

done quickly. It requires some agreements with the two Kurdish

groups in the north, and it requires some work in the south, but

it can be done quickly. It can be done before the next hearing of

this subcommittee on this subject, of that I am absolutely certain,

and if they cannot do it, then we will know very quickly that they

cannot do it, but I believe they can.

That political presence is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of

Saddam’s rule, and every change in situations like this begins with

that. It happened to Ceaucescu, it happened to Milosevic, and it

will happen here, too. The moment people see there is an alternative,

the moment that that veil of invincibility is pierced, there

is a political dynamic that takes place, and anyone who has ever

run for office knows how quickly things change, the moment it

looks as though you can stand up and oppose the power that dominates.

So the establishment of a political presence, coupled with broadcasting

and publishing so that Saddam would lose his monopoly

over the flow of information could lead again, as it did in 1995, in

1996, to a situation in which Saddam would be politically challenged

very fundamentally and, at that point, if he wished to take

military action, he would have to move his forces in a way that

would present us with very attractive targets.

I have heard it said today that we ought to go after serious targets.

Mort Halperin said we should go after serious targets. I cannot

imagine a more serious target than a column of tanks attempting

to root out dissidents in the south who are clamoring for a

change of regime.

Do we always have to abandon our friends? Of course we do not.

They were abandoned in his administration. He did not have anything

to do with it, I understand that, but there is nothing inevitable

about abandoning your friends and allies, and to say we will

not even try because the last lot did not have the guts to stick with

it seems to me a recipe for defeatism. It is defeatism.

So I think there is a great deal that can be done with the opposition.

I think those of us who have been privileged to know the opposition

have come to appreciate and understand that potential.

The Congress clearly has recognized it in the action it has taken

before, and I hope that you will encourage the new administration

to take a new look, to sit down with the opposition and talk about

the ways in which, beginning with the establishment of a political

presence and leading ultimately to a political challenge to Saddam

Hussein, to which, if he makes a military response, we have available

assets in the air to protect that opposition, I hope you will

urge the administration to consider that course, because none of

the other things that are under consideration, no matter how hard

we try to persuade ourselves about improved sanctions or smarter

sanctions, none of them are going to end the threat from Saddam

Hussein.

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I do

not have a prepared statement. For the convenience of the subcommittee I have listed

on this page the key issues which, in my view, must shape any American policy

toward Iraq. I will try to cover each of them in a short opening statement.

Does the regime of Saddam Hussein pose a threat to the interests of the

United States and its allies? How does the magnitude of that threat today compare

with what it was a decade ago at the end of Desert Storm? What about

this time two years ago? How about last year?

Does Saddam Hussein now possess weapons of mass destruction? How

much do we know about his programs with respect to chemical, biological and

nuclear weapons? Are any such programs proceeding?

How can we end Saddam’s programs to obtain weapons of mass destruction

and the means to deliver them?

In the absence of U.N. inspectors, how much can we expect to learn about

these programs?

Would a return of U.N. inspectors give us confidence that Saddam’s programs

would be terminated and that any weapons of mass destruction he may

now have would be surrendered?

Would a return of inspectors justify the normalization of relations with

Saddam?

Beyond weapons of mass destruction, what should we think of the claim

that Saddam is ‘‘contained?’’

Are the present sanctions working? Can they be made more effective?

Can we—should we—rebuild the coalition that opposed Saddam following

the invasion of Kuwait?

Can we have confidence in the U.N. administration of programs affecting

Iraq?

Can we secure ourselves, our forces in the field and our friends and allies

in the region as long as Saddam is in power?

What are the prospects for removing Saddam’s regime from power?

How can we work with the INC to bring about a change in the Iraqi regime?

Mort wants smart sanctions, I want smart weapons.

We have both been in the Pentagon, but he was there before me.

With the really smart weapons we now have the capability, in

situations like the military situation that would exist in Iraq, to do

really quite extraordinary things with air power, to hit the targets

at which we aim almost all the time, and to do so without significant

risk to our own pilots, particularly in a situation where we

control the air, and so there is no comparison between the air operation

that we faced in Kosovo, in my view, and the kinds of air operations

that would be required in the Iraqi desert, dealing with

columns of armor moving over a very thin road network and

through narrow defiles and passes in the north.

This is ideal territory for air warfare, as we saw during Desert

Storm. You saw the roads and the highways, so the potential for

air power is vastly greater. I am not saying you will never need

any ground force, but we are not talking about a Desert Storm

scale of activity.

Senator, I do not want to propel us into an argument

about the advice that led to the policies of the past, but let me just

say that one of the documents that purports to be definitive with

respect to the quality of the opposition, prepared by an organization

I will not identify, is short on facts, but one of the facts it purports

to relate to the reader is that the head of the Iraqi National

Congress travels with 26 bodyguards.

Now, he happens to be in the room, and he is surrounded by no

bodyguards at all. That is the quality of the expert advice that we

have been given for years, and if this committee wants a really interesting

and challenging assignment, it would be to review the

last 30 years of expert advice on the gulf from the institutions on

which we have come to rely.

There is some history here, and the history important. In 1995,

the Iraqi opposition in the north of Iraq planned a military operation from which United States support was withdrawn at the last

minute. They thought it was too late to terminate the operation altogether,

and it was initiated. It resulted very quickly in the destruction

of two Iraqi divisions. This was with very little support

from the United States, and none at all at the crucial moment.

In 1996, when Saddam Hussein moved into the north, only after

securing the agreement of one of the Kurdish factions, and without

that agreement they could not have moved unopposed into the

north, when Saddam Hussein did that, he did it because the defections

from his own military forces were mounting in such numbers

that he understood he had to act.

Now, unhappily, at that moment we did not have the will, we did

not have the resolve, we did not have the determination to exercise

the air power we had which in modest application would have, I

believe would have ended Saddam’s regime then and there.

This is not as daunting a prospect as people say it is, and it is

true Saddam is brutal beyond imagination. It is also true that men

who rule like that earn enemies in the millions, and when things

begin to turn, they can and do turn very fast.

This war, if it happens, this liberation of Iraq, if it happens, will

be conducted principally by Iraqis both from the armed forces joining

the political opposition in the north and south, with a little bit

of help from American air power.

I think the distinctions will be lost on most observers

between containment and containment mark 2. It is bound to be

viewed——

We may not be as far apart as Mort thinks. I think

Mort has not looked at—and correct me if I am wrong—at ways in

which a policy of support to the opposition could entail containment

of risk, so that one would begin—I mean, Mort referred to arming

the opposition. He did not hear anything about arming the opposition

from me, that the usual perception is we are going to start

issuing weapons to the opposition and invite them to march toward

Baghdad. That certainly is not my concept. It is not General

Downing’s concept. It is not the concept of the opposition figures

that I have consulted with.

Our views differ, but my own view is that you start with a return

of the opposition to the north, to the north and parts of the south

that are not under Saddam’s control. I do not think there is a lot

he can do about that in the near term, and he might not even be

motivated to do a lot about it in the near term.

As they begin to gather political strength, eventually they become

a political challenge of some importance. We could talk then

about what you would need in terms of military resources from outside

and from inside, and what you could expect to get from defections

from the Iraqi forces, what might even be there, latent now,

underground because there is no external support of any kind, not

even financial external support, but I think you could contain the

risk in the sense that if the political operation did not appear to

be succeeding, then you would not necessarily take the next step.

One of the things that I think has discouraged people from looking

at options in this area is the sense that a decision to support

an opposition strategy is the decision to launch an attack against

Baghdad, and that looks pretty daunting under current circumstances.

I certainly would not recommend that.

But the opposition themselves are prepared to risk their lives.

They make judgments, have to make judgments every day about

how much protection they require and how much risk they are prepared

to take, and they believe there are feasible options in which

they can engage, and I think we do not have to accept a 2 or 3-

year scenario to take those first steps.